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Divergent Opinions and Value
Stock Performance
BY JOHN A. DOUKAS
T
hose who believe that capital markets—that is, markets for stocks and bonds—operate efficiently and
asset prices fully reflect all publicly available information are engaged in an ongoing debate about the
exact interpretation of the “value premium” with those who reject this view. Value premium refers to
the superior returns generated by the purchase of value stocks relative to growth, or glamour, stocks.
Rationalists, the group believing in market efficiency, argue that because value stocks are fundamen-
tally riskier than growth stocks, the value premium is compensation for bearing risk. Behavioralists,
the group arguing that market asset prices don’t reflect all publicly available information, however, claim that value
stocks produce higher returns mostly because investors consistently overestimate the future earnings of growth stocks
relative to value stocks. The essence of this argument is that investors are excessively pessimistic about value stocks
because they tie their earnings expectations to past earnings. That is, investors make systematic errors in predicting
future growth in earnings for value stocks, and investors’ excessive pessimism about these stocks causes the superior
performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks. This behavioral explanation of the value premium is known as
the “extrapolation” or “errors-in-expectations” explanation, and many researchers support it.
Recently, some fellow researchers and I, using U.S.
analyst earnings forecasts as a proxy for the market’s expecta-
tions of future earnings, provided evidence against the errors-
in-expectations view. Therefore, the observed abnormal
return of value stocks on earnings announcement days is
obviously not caused by surprise in the level of earnings but
by some different mechanism. This mechanism of disagree-
ment about future payoffs of company stocks, the focus of
our recent work, provides an alternative explanation for the
“value premium” puzzle.
Investors’ Divergent
Opinions Affect Risk Level
In our article, published in the Journal of Finance
(2002), we argued that previous researchers of both schools
of thought (rationalists and behavioralists) have overlooked
investor differences of opinion as a possible source of risk
that could explain the value premium anomaly. While dis-
agreement among investors is widely recognized as the main
source of stock trading, it has been overlooked as a potential
explanation of the “value premium” puzzle. 
The concept of heterogeneous beliefs dates back to
F.H. Knight’s (1921) work, but was ignored in rational and
behavior asset pricing models. These models invariably
assume that investor beliefs are homogeneous and, on the
average, do not matter when it comes to the determination of
asset prices. A few exceptions to this notion exist and our
work builds on the very old concept of “Knightian uncer-
tainty” rather than risk. According to Knight, the true meas-
ure of risk is “uncertainty,” not risk that the finance
profession conveniently measures as the departure from the
average (i.e., deviation from the mean). Conventional finance
theorists also tend to believe that the mean of the stock
return distribution is bell-shaped and well-known a priori!
When you drop this set of convenient and unrealistic
assumptions, you can easily arrive at a positive relationship
between stock returns and investor disagreement. This is also
consistent with Knight’s measure of risk, simply because as
uncertainty about the future payoffs of stock returns
increases, so does the disagreement among investors. Investor
disagreement, then, emerges as a source of risk, nonfunda-
mental, that warrants compensation. That is, greater disagree-
ment among investors about the future performance of a
stock acts as a source of risk, arising from uncertainty that
deters investors from purchasing the stock unless they get
compensated with a premium.
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Uncertainty Drives
Rates of Return
Higher
Hence, in this framework, we
argue that the superior future perform-
ance of certain stocks arises because not
all investors possess completely accurate
beliefs about what is likely to happen.
Heterogeneous expectations among
investors matter in asset pricing
because the opportunity set, or the
future return payoffs of stocks, is partly
unknown. When investors don’t know
what the real chances are of certain
stock return payoffs, they tend to have
different subjective opinions of the
future prospects of stocks. When
uncertainty about the future prospects
of a stock is high, subjective beliefs will
diverge, causing investors to demand
high rates of return to invest in the
stock. 
An alternative view is that the
higher returns for stocks exposed to
greater disagreement among investors
arise because, in imperfect capital mar-
kets, capital market equilibrium
requires determining the asset prices
and also the identity of investors trad-
ing in each asset at the same time.
Dispersion of opinion, then,
may represent a unique source of risk,
and its impact on prices should be
compounded by the degree of disagree-
ment. To examine this issue, we used
dispersion in analysts’ earnings fore-
casts as a proxy for investors’ heteroge-
neous beliefs. We proposed that value
stocks have greater exposure to disper-
sion in forecasts and, therefore, should
earn a higher return than growth stocks
with lower exposure.
Our results are consistent with
the investor disagreement explanation
for the return differences between value
and growth stocks. We found that the
divergence in analysts’ earnings fore-
casts, a proxy for investor disagree-
ment, is much higher for portfolios
composed of stocks that include value
stocks. We obtained similar results
when we compared the extreme portfo-
lios of stocks ranked by size. Small-cap-
italization stocks, those representing
smaller companies, exhibited greater
forecast dispersion than stocks of large
companies. These results suggest that
value stocks and small-cap stocks earn
higher returns because there is greater
disagreement among investors about
the stocks’ future payoffs.
Our tests confirmed that
investor disagreement, manifested in
the dispersion of analysts’ earnings
forecasts, is a risk factor that is priced,
together with other risk factors such as
size and book-to-market, in the deter-
mination of value stock and small-cap
stock returns. It is worth emphasizing
that the disagreement risk factor plays
an important role in affecting stock
returns. These results are consistent
with the view that investors require
higher returns for stocks exposed to
greater investor disagreement. For risk-
averse investors the implication is obvi-
ous: avoid investing in stocks that are
subject to heightened disagreement
among market participants about their
future performance. 
These findings have important
implications for corporate financing
and investment decisions, investment
banking strategies and security design.
At the aggregate level, our results also
have implications for policy-making
decisions. In sum, we cannot continue
assuming that economic agents have
the same expectations, and when their
beliefs tend to diverge from one
another they do not matter, on average.
Empirical evidence fails to support this
view. 
The idea of disagreement has the
potential to explain several economic
and business phenomena. An interest-
ing application of the concept of dis-
agreement is China (treat it as a
stock/firm). The low disagreement
among world investors/businesses
about the future economic prospects of
China during the last 10 years has
reduced the disagreement premium for
China substantially! As a result, China
has experienced an unprecedented
inflow (foreign direct investment) of
capital. This, of course, was not the
case prior to China’s policy change
adopted about 10 years ago. Hence, the
required premium to invest in China
used to be so high that it prohibited
any inflow of foreign capital into the
Chinese markets. The result? Poverty.
Overall, the reduction of investor dis-
agreement about the future prospects
of a stock/country by CEOs/govern-
ment (policy makers) is essential to
economic growth and prosperity. 
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